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This paper asks under what conditions it is possible for a wildlife department in 
west Africa without an external budget to protect all rare and endangered species, and if 
so, what is the impact on rural inhabitants engaged in hunting. Protecting wildlife in this 
region is particularly tricky. Hunting is important for rural livelihoods, but when 
unregulated can result in the loss of species. Government funding for wildlife 
departments is rarely sufficient and so they must increasingly look towards revenue-
generating activities such as the sale of permits for hunting common species combined 
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Wanted dead and alive:  




Increasingly in sub-Saharan Africa, wildlife departments must function in an 
environment of insufficient government funding. Hence they must look to revenue 
generating activities to supplement their budgets. In east and southern Africa, many 
options are available, including tourism and ￿trophy hunting.￿ Yet in west Africa, the 
motivation for this paper, the benefits from protecting wildlife, such as protection of 
biodiversity and existence values, do not naturally translate into income for the 
department. Most hunting is for meat, undertaken by villagers and professional hunters, 
thereby generating revenue for the community but not the wildlife department (Bowen-
Jones et al, 2003). And there are few ￿charismatic￿ species to attract tourists in 
significant numbers. 
A key question for an under-funded wildlife department is to what extent it is able 
to generate sufficient revenue to protect the country￿s wildlife, particularly rare and 
endangered species. And if it is unable, what is the minimum level of external funding 
required to achieve its objective. A further issue, critical from a livelihoods perspective, 
is the impact that any revenue-generating activities undertaken by the wildlife department 
have on the livelihoods of rural people who are highly dependent on the natural resource 
base, including access to wildlife as a source of both food and income. 
In general, the major expense for a wildlife department is enforcement, protecting 
wildlife from local and professional hunters. Hence this paper uses as its theoretical 
framework an optimal enforcement model. The fundamental issues for law enforcement 
were posed by Becker (1968). He asked how many offenses should be permitted, and 
how many offenders should go unpunished. Typically in the literature the enforcement 
agency aims to maximize social welfare. Because enforcement is costly, and particularly 
when individuals choose between different crimes or different levels of a criminal    2 
activity, in equilibrium it is optimal to have both a positive level of enforcement and a 
positive level of the illegal activity (see, for example, Stigler, 1970; Sutinen and 
Andersen, 1985; Milliman, 1986; Clarke, Reed, and Shrestha, 1993).  
Wildlife departments can consider scope for revenue generation through a mix of 
fines, registration fees, and the sale of permits. When cost recovery is an objective, fines 
can no longer be considered simply transfers from the individual caught undertaking an 
illegal activity to the enforcer ￿ as is the typical assumption in the optimal enforcement 
literature. Rather, fines for those caught with rare species, along with revenues from the 
sale of hunting permits, become key potential revenue sources. The sale of permits for 
hunting also implies the legalization of hunting activities that might previously have been 
illegal. Moreover, again in contrast to the standard literature, under conditions of cost 
recovery, the probability of detection is unlikely to be independent of the level of the fine. 
Cost recovery is a reasonable objective when the social returns to an activity are 
no greater than the private. However, if this is not so, as is the case for a wildlife 
department, the revenues generated from enforcement may not cover the costs of the 
socially optimal level of enforcement. Polinsky (1980) concluded that under such 
circumstances private enforcement ￿ in which the profit-maximizing enforcement agency 
aims to maximize fine revenue less the cost of enforcement ￿ may not be appropriate (see 
also Landes and Posner, 1975; Garoupa, 1997). However the implications of cost 
recovery, rather than simply a comparison of private and socially optimal enforcement, 
have not been explored. 
This paper asks specifically whether a wildlife department can hope to prevent all 
rare animals from being shot when constrained by the need to recover its costs. This is, 
for many policy makers with constrained budgets, the key practical question. The paper 
also looks explicitly at the impact of such a policy of cost recovery on the welfare of    3 
villagers for whom hunting is an important source of income and food. Reducing conflict 
between those who protect resources and those who use resources is increasingly 
important, as the enforcement paradigm shifts from interdiction and control towards more 
conciliatory approaches (Bowen-Jones et al, 2002). The paper does not seek to calculate 
the socially optimal level of enforcement. The mathematics of such a question is a 
relatively simple unconstrained optimization model, and many such models can be found 
in the enforcement literature (examples include Demsetz, 1964; Stigler, 1970; Milliman, 
1986, Shavell, 1993).  
Where cost recovery is not consistent with protecting all rare species, then either a 
subsidy is required in the form of an external budget, or the wildlife department and 
society must accept the loss of rare animals. Hence this paper is also relevant for a 
conservation-oriented agency in terms of the extent to which it can fulfill a remit to 
protect endangered species with a fixed budget that can be supplemented with revenue 
from fines and the sale of permits. Full cost recovery simply implies that the external 
budget is zero. 
In the following section, a model of hunting is developed that explores the 
feasibility of cost recovery when hunting technology is sufficient for hunters to choose 
which species they shoot.1 The implications of non-selective hunting and enforcement 
technologies are explored in Section 3. Finally, the policy implications of the model are 
discussed in Section 4.  
                                                 
1   There is some skepticism as to whether such selectivity is possible, but certainly 
people who hunt with guns in the daytime can, if they so choose, be selective. See 
Bowen-Jones et al (2003) for a more detailed discussion.    4 
2. Model 
Hunting is complex, and this paper does not purport to model specific hunting 
behavior in detail. However, a few details about hunting are useful to motivate the model. 
In west and central Africa, people hunt wildlife typically for meat, which is either 
consumed by the hunter or sold. Both vulnerable and common species are often found in 
the same geographical location, and so the only alternative to complete exclusion, even if 
it were possible, is selective hunting (Bowen-Jones et al, 2003).  
Selective hunting can only be achieved if both the technology is available and the 
incentives are appropriate. Snares are relatively non-discriminatory in terms of which 
animals are caught, though some snares are designed to differentiate between large and 
small animals. However, increasing the frequency that a snare is checked increases the 
likelihood that a rare animal is found alive in the snare and so can be released thereby 
increasing the effective selectivity. Hunting with guns is more discriminatory. Hunters 
typically can identify different species from a distance and could, in theory, choose 
whether or not to shoot a particular animal.  
In the model, a large number of risk-neutral hunters, identical in all respects 
except for their opportunity costs of labor, live in and around a forested area. The model 
permits a single hunting expedition, which can be of varying length, in which a hunter 
can only shoot one animal, after which he returns home.2 A regulatory agency is 
                                                 
2   The hunting period is assumed to be considerably less than the reproductive cycle of 
either species. Further, the emphasis of the paper is on cost recovery and not the detailed 
modeling of population dynamics, hence the focus on a single hunting expedition where 
only one animal is shot. Alternative hunting strategies observed by the author in Ghana 
include: hunt until you can carry no more bushmeat; until you run out of provisions; or 
until you run out of bullets. On-going research addresses multiperiod issues, including a 
growth function for the bushmeat species, and permitting hunters to choose how many    5 
responsible for the wildlife in the forest. There are two types of animal that, from the 
hunters￿ perspective, are more or less valuable when sold as bushmeat, the price being 
driven by consumer preferences. From the regulatory agency￿s perspective, the two types 
of animals are rare and hence socially valuable, or common, in which case they have no 
value over and above their value as bushmeat. The key potential revenue sources 
available to the wildlife department are the sale of hunting permits, and fines for those 
caught hunting illegally. 
The regulatory agency￿s objective is to minimize the number of rare animals that 
are killed, subject to a budget constraint, with a secondary concern being the welfare of 
hunters. In this cost recovery model, the agency has no external budget but it does have 
two strategies that can be used separately or in combination: the imposition of fines, and 
the introduction of permits. Conceptually, fines could be imposed on hunters caught with 
rare or common species, and similarly hunters could be required to purchase permits for 
hunting both or either the rare and common species. For the purposes of this paper, and to 
avoid lengthy less interesting reformulations of the model, permits are sold only for 
hunting the common species. Fines are imposed on hunters who are caught with a rare 
animal, or with a common animal without a permit. The maximum fine that can be 
imposed is F, a common assumption in the literature, else the enforcement agency could 
reduce the cost of enforcement to zero by setting an infinite fine.3 Further, fines 
                                                                                                                                                
animals to shoot and hence when to stop hunting in any given period. The assumptions of 
the model in this paper enable analytical tractability whilst not compromising the key 
contribution of the model. 
3   Moreover, a fine typically will be capped by the wealth of the individual who is 
caught. Although different hunters will in reality have different levels of wealth, for ease 
of calculation F is assumed constant for all hunters. Not only is this the common 
assumption in the optimal enforcement literature. In practice, only recently, and only in    6 
considered excessive encourage increased avoidance activities and may not be politically 
viable (see, for example, Lear and Maxwell, 1998; Rodriguez-Ibeas, 2002). Following 
Becker￿s (1968) framework for optimal enforcement, fines are assumed costless to 
impose.  
The government could generate revenue by also make the hunting of common 
species illegal, and fining those caught with a common species. However, for a 
government also concerned with the welfare of village hunters, the more satisfactory 
approach is that explored in this paper, to combine the sale of permits for those who want 
to hunt the common species with fines for those who are caught either with a rare species 
or with a common species but without a permit.  
When the common species is also the more palatable species, for example, in 
some parts of Ghana cane rat is a common vermin species yet the most preferred 
bushmeat species, the government￿s job is relatively easy. The government wants to 
protect the rare less-palatable species and the hunter would prefer to shoot the common 
more-palatable species (Bowen-Jones et al 2002). The more interesting scenario, and 
hence the focus of this paper, is that in which the rare animal is also the more palatable, 
in which case conflict is more likely because the scarce more-palatable animal is valued 
highest by both the government (when the animal is alive) and the hunter (when the 
animal is dead). One such example is the drill in Cameroon, which is both endangered 
and a preferred bushmeat species. In cases where animals and birds are sold live, almost 
always the most privately valuable species will also be the most endangered species. 
                                                                                                                                                
some countries, are there examples of fines being contingent on an individual￿s wealth 
(Bar-Niv and Safra, 2002).    7 
2.1 The individual hunter 
The hunter￿s objective is to maximize his expected net revenues from hunting. A 
Poisson arrival process is used to model the opportunity a hunter gets to shoot an animal. 
More-palatable (and rare) animals, denoted by the subscript M, arrive at a rate  M λ  and 
less palatable (common), denoted by the subscript L, arrive at a rate  L λ . Hence the 
probability, α , that a more palatable animal arrives first is  ( ) L M M λ λ λ +  and the 
probability, 1-α , that a less palatable arrives first is  ( ) L M L λ λ λ + . Hunters are assumed 
to be accurate ￿ if they shoot, they do not miss. 
There are seven possible strategies available to the hunter, listed in Table 1, and 
denoted by jk S , where j denotes whether or not the hunter purchases a permit to hunt the 
less-palatable common species (j=p or 0 respectively), and k denotes whether the hunter 
chooses to hunt only the less-palatable common, L, only the more-palatable rare, M, or 
the first species that turns up, F. The hunter can also choose not to go hunting, k=0. The 
probability of being caught is written p, where p is a function of the enforcement budget 
B (p’(B)>0 and p’’(B)<0).4 The market price of the less-palatable common animal is 
chosen to be the numeraire; the market price of the more-palatable rare animal is y (y>1); 
hunter i￿s opportunity cost of labor is  i w ; the cost of a permit is R; the fine for not having 
a permit when shooting the common animal is G, and for hunting the rare species is F.  
                                                 
4   The probability that a hunter is caught does not depend on which species he is 
hunting. Further, a hunter can only be punished if he is in possession of an illegal species, 
hence the time spent before an animal turns up does not affect the probability of being 
caught. That is, being in the forest with a gun is not in itself an illegal activity. If the 
hunter could choose how many animals to hunt before returning home, then the time 
spent hunting could affect the probability of being caught in possession of a dead animal.    8 
An individual hunter faces uncertainty over the returns to hunting because he does 
not know when an animal will turn up and, if he is hunting illegally, whether or not he 
will be caught. The agency faces no uncertainty since there are a large number of hunters. 
Hence the agency knows how its choice of enforcement effort will affect hunting 
decisions and hence the number of rare species shot. 
For the regulatory agency to achieve its objective of preventing any rare species 
from being shot, it must ensure that, whether or not a hunter purchases a permit, he only 
shoots the common animal. That is, if a common animal turns up first, the hunter shoots 
it, and if a rare animal turns up first, he waits for a common animal. To reduce conflict, 
and in reality to reduce also the costs of implementing punishments, the agency also 
would want people to purchase a permit when hunting the common species, rather than 
risk incurring a fine.  
If no rare species are shot and all hunters purchase a permit, five conditions C1 
through C5 must hold (Table 2). These can be reduced to the following three statements: 
(1) If it is worthwhile for an individual to hunt, he chooses whether or not he purchases a 
permit; (2) If a less palatable animal turns up, whether he shoots or ￿gambles￿ and waits 
for a more palatable animal; and (3) If a more palatable animal turns up whether he 
shoots or ￿gambles￿ and waits for a less palatable animal.  
A hunter who does not purchase a permit will hunt only the common species so 
long as conditions C4 and C5 hold, that is, so long as: 
  () () G p w L i + − < 1 β λ  and  ( ) ( ) G p w M i + − − > 1 β λ  (1) 
Only one of these conditions will be binding.     9 
To ensure that individuals who choose to hunt only the common animal purchase 
a permit, condition C3 must hold: 
  1 − ≥ p R G    (2) 
If condition C4 holds, then C1 must also hold. Similarly, if C5 holds, then C2 must also 
hold.  
 
2.2 Aggregate hunter behavior and the government￿s optimal strategy 
To determine the aggregate hunting behavior, assumptions over the number of 
potential hunters and their opportunity costs of labor are required. Suppose there are N 
potential hunters whose opportunity costs of labor vary uniformly between  min w  and 
max w . The assumption of such heterogeneity among hunters is a reasonable one in a rural 
village setting where land and labor markets do not function efficiently, where some 
hunters are also farmers who hunt only at certain times of the year, and where some 
people get positive utility simply from going out hunting. A simple uniform distribution 
enables analytical tractability without compromising the model and its findings. 
The model is solved in the following way. First it is assumed that cost recovery and 
full protection of endangered species can be achieved. That is, that the five key 
conditions C1 through C5 hold for all hunters. The implied maximum enforcement 
budget, Bmax , and hence the maximum probability that can be achieved,  ( ) max B p , is then 
calculated, given these conditions. If no hunter chooses to shoot a rare species given this 
maximum probability of detection, then protection of rare species is indeed compatible 
with cost recovery.    10 
If the five conditions C1 through C5 hold, income from the sale of permits, and 
hence the maximum budget available for enforcement, is equal to the proportion of 
hunters for whom the net returns to hunting are positive, multiplied by the number of 
potential hunters N and the cost of a permit R. That is, the maximum enforcement budget 
is given by: 






















Equation 3 shows that Bmax is quadratic in R (B’’(R)<0). If the price of a permit is 
increased there are two key effects. First, although the revenue generated per hunter 
increases, villagers with higher opportunity costs of labor will stop hunting as the 
expected returns to hunting become negative (villagers will only hunt if condition C6 
holds). Second, for those with lower opportunity costs of labor, hunting the rare species 
without a permit becomes more attractive relative to hunting the common species with a 
permit. Hence if the permit price is raised, the greater the probability of being caught that 
is required to stop low-cost villagers from hunting rare species (marginal deterrence 
condition). 
More formally, if no rare species are to be shot, the following two conditions for pi 
must hold (setting  1 − = p R G  (C3), substituting into C4 and C5, and expanding β  as 




















Only the first condition is binding. 
Whether there is indeed some price of the permit for which the government can 
cover its costs and ensure that no rare species are shot can be determined by comparing    11 
Equations 3 and 4.  These conditions are demonstrated graphically in Figure 1. Figure 1a 
illustrates a situation in which cost recovery is consistent with protecting all rare species, 
and Figure 1b a situation in which it is not. In the latter case, the minimum external 
budget E required to supplement the sale of permits whilst protecting the rare species is 
also shown. 
Algebraically, cost recovery is possible so long as: 
  ( ) max B p ≥
F y
w R y L i
+
+ + − λ 1
 (5) 
Cost recovery is achievable and compatible with protecting all rare species and 
relying only on the sale of permits so long as 
* R ≤ R ≤ b R  (see Figure 1a). And the 
agency achieves cost recovery and gains surplus revenue if 
* R <R < b R . The optimal 
permit price depends on the agency￿s particular objective. Initially, increasing the price of 
the permit above the minimum permit price 
* R  reduces hunter welfare because permit 
prices are higher and more hunters stop hunting, but increases the agency revenue over 
and above that needed for cost recovery, providing the agency with a surplus. However, if 
R  is increased above  a R , both agency excess revenue and hunter welfare decrease. For a 
regulatory agency interested in both protecting endangered species and maximizing 
hunter welfare, the optimal permit price is 
* R . For revenue maximization, the optimal 
permit price is Ra. 
If cost recovery and protection of all rare species is not possible, a regulatory 
agency with access to an external budget sets the permit level to be R** (Figure 1b) such 
that: 






 (6)    12 
Permit revenue is supplemented with an external budget of size E (Figure 1b). If no 
external budget is available, then the agency must accept that some rare species will be 
shot, in which case it can use the fine revenue collected from those caught shooting the 
rare species to supplement revenue from the sale of permits and so increase the 
probability of detection.  
 
3. The implications of non-selective hunting technology 
If hunters are not able to be selective when hunting, then differential enforcement 
will have a very different impact. Such a scenario is realistic if, for example, hunters use 
non-selective snares that are only checked every three or four days at which point the 
snared animal is already dead. Some hunters who use guns have reported that they cannot 
tell what they are shooting when they hunt at night, though such a suggestion is 
controversial (personal communication, Ghana, 2001; Bowen-Jones et al, 2003).  
With differential enforcement, hunters who cannot be, or choose not to be, selective 
must, once an animal is dead, choose whether to take it but risk being caught with an 
illegal carcass, or discard it and wait for another animal to turn up. That is, these hunters 
do not choose which species they kill, but they can choose to discard a dead animal ￿ 
either it is low value or there is a high probability of being fined. Hence differential 
enforcement, when hunting does not allow selectivity, could result in significant waste, 
with rare animals being killed and discarded. Moreover, the incentives to purchase a 
permit to hunt the common species would be reduced, thus reducing the department￿s 
revenue. Equally, if enforcement is concentrated around traders (where bushmeat is 
concentrated) rather than the hunters, then differential enforcement could simply result in 
hunters consuming illegally caught species and selling those that are legal.    13 
4. Concluding thoughts 
Enforcement has to be paid for. If a government wildlife department does not have 
an external budget, or if the external budget is insufficient for the department to achieve 
its objectives, then it will have to look to revenue-generating activities to supplement the 
budget. The strategies available to the department will depend on the specific country 
situation, and will in most cases be influenced by both the need to protect endangered 
species and the impact of its strategy on the welfare of people who depend on wildlife for 
their livelihoods. The department will almost inevitably face trade-offs. An optimal 
permit scheme may neither lead to a social optimum, nor result in optimal ecological 
management. However, in many less-developed countries, the reality is one of limited 
budgets and departments must do the best that they can. 
This paper suggests that protection of endangered species may require the 
legalization of some hunting, thereby providing the wildlife department with a revenue 
base for protecting endangered species. Enforcement becomes more complex in such a 
situation. Firstly, in many countries in west and central Africa most, if not all, hunting is 
illegal. A move that permits selective hunting might encourage people to see hunting in 
general as acceptable, and so greater efforts would be needed to explain why some 
animals can be hunted whereas others cannot. Secondly, exclusion from areas where both 
the common and rare species are found may no longer be appropriate. For example, 
hunters may be allowed to enter areas where endangered species are prevalent, making 
protection of these species more difficult. Thirdly, whether or not fine revenue is returned 
to the specific government agency is critical. If there are problems of corruption, permits 
may not be purchased if paying a bribe is cheaper, hence fine revenue to the agency will 
be lower than anticipated.     14 
The introduction of a permit system means that, in practice, the hunter is paying for 
the protection of rare and endangered species, in return for which he gets the right to hunt 
the non-endangered species. If permits cannot raise sufficient income to protect the rare 
species from hunters, and no external budget is available, then the enforcement agency 
must either supplement its income with fine revenue, or where feasible, could introduce 
so-called trophy hunting, which brings in large funds that can be used for wildlife 
protection and to compensate local residents for loss of hunting rights. A small number of 
rare animals are killed to raise funds to protect and enhance the number of remaining 
animals. The trade-off is between explicitly allowing the killing of rare animals as 
￿trophies,￿ and accepting that some will be killed illegally. The amount paid by those 
who trophy hunt, typically wealthy foreigners, will almost always be considerably more 
than the maximum fine that can be imposed on those local poachers that are caught. 
However, there are moral, reputation, and international treaty implications of legitimizing 
the hunting of rare species. In west Africa, such a strategy is unlikely to work, as most 
hunting is for meat and there are few charismatic species. Moreover, by definition, the 
government could not achieve its objective of no rare animals being shot. 
Both hunting technology and the ￿technology of enforcement￿ are critical in 
determining whether selective hunting is possible, and the impact of enforcement on 
species numbers. One of the key problems at the moment for those involved in attempting 
to regulate the bushmeat trade is that hunters are rarely selective. This is in part because 
the enforcement incentives are not appropriate, and hunters are rarely caught and 
punished, but also because the technology is not sufficiently selective. Selective hunting 
is more costly. Checking traps more frequently may be difficult if people are also 
farmers, in which case, they often do not make specific trips to check the traps but rather 
check the traps when they are also undertaking farming activities. Choosing not to shoot a 
rare animal means spending more time hunting, which is also more costly. Hence not    15 
surprisingly, achieving differential hunting in practice is not simple. However, this paper 
demonstrates the conditions under which incentives are such that hunters might be 
expected to be selective in their hunting. 
Examples of more sophisticated ￿enforcement technology￿ can be found. One such 
is the use of fishing permits which state that fish within a particular size range (those that 
breed more productively) must be released. Similarly, prohibiting the killing of pregnant 
animals should have a positive impact on populations, achievable, for example, through 
the introduction of hunting seasons. 
This paper used a single period model to explore cost recovery. Within a multi-
period framework, an interesting additional benefit from the use of permits to regulate the 
hunting of common species is revealed. If a permit system was to be introduced in an area 
where hunting common species was de facto open access, the permit could act akin to a 
Pigouvian tax, increasing the cost of hunting the common species. In a single-period 
analysis, permits appear to reduce hunter welfare. However, the price of a permit could 
be set to manipulate common species numbers in the long run, thereby improving hunter 
welfare relative to the open access situation.  
The requirement of cost recovery is an increasing reality in less-developed 
countries, and hence the analysis of this paper has more general implications. 
Government agencies are being required to function as revenue-seeking parastatals, rather 
than relying on externally determined and granted budgets (Nolan and Turbat, 1995). 
This requirement of cost recovery is due both to budget shortages and the desire for 
improved accountability and macroeconomic stability. In Ghana, the IMF and World 
Bank have proposed privatization and full ￿cost recovery￿ for urban water supplies.  But 
such a policy is controversial, especially when there are benefits associated with the 
supply of a resource that are not reflected by the market. Similarly, cost recovery through    16 
the introduction of ￿user fees￿ has been introduced in Ghana￿s health care and education 
sector, and has been mooted for other sectors.  
    17 
Table 1: Returns to hunting strategies  
Hunter strategy  Expected returns to strategy for given probability of detection p 
00 S   Do not hunt (and do not purchase a permit)  0 






PF S   Purchase a permit and shoot the first animal that turns up  () R
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Table 2: Conditions for hunter to adopt a strategy of purchasing a permit and shooting only the common animal  
Condition*     Explanation   
C1:  L i w λ − 1> ( ) pF y p − − 1   ⇒  β λL i w <   If a rare animal turns up, the hunter who has purchased a 
permit will wait for the common animal  
C2: 1>( ) pF y p − − 1- M i w λ    ⇒  i w >- M λ β   If a common animal turns up, the hunter who has purchased 
a permit will shoot rather than wait for the rare species 
C3:  ( ) L i L i w pG p R w λ λ − − − > − − 1 1   ⇒  1 − > p R G   It is better to hunt only the common species with a permit 
than without  
C4: ( ) L i w pG p λ − − − 1> ( ) pF y p − − 1   ⇒  ( ) ( ) G p w L i + − < 1 β λ   If the hunter does not purchase a permit and a rare species 
turns up first, it is better to wait for the common species to 
turn up  
C5: ( ) pG p − − 1> ( ) pF y p − − 1- M i w λ   ⇒  ( ) ( ) G p w M i + − − > 1 β λ   If the hunter does not purchase a permit and a common 
species turns up first, it is better to shoot the common animal 
than wait for a rare animal   
C6:  0 1 > − − R w L i λ    ⇒  ( ) R w L i − < 1 λ   Non-negativity constraint, it is better to purchase a permit 
and hunt common than not go hunting  
 









       M i n i m u m   p required 
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Probability              to prevent all hunting of rare species 
of being caught 
              E,  Additional budget required to prevent all  




         
 
 
 R**      Cost of permit 
Figure 1b: Cost recovery not consistent with protecting all rare species 
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